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Articles
Options for Long-Term Care Financing:
A Look to the Future
by
B.

MARsmL

KAPP*

People always have feared growing older for a variety of reasons:
physical and mental decline, functional impairment and dependence
on others, diminishing opportunities to pursue enjoyable and fulfilling
activities, and inevitable loss of family members and friends. In the
contemporary United States, financial impoverishment,' with its attendant restrictions on lifestyle and its dampening of an elder's ability
to leave a significant financial inheritance to her heirs, is perhaps the
2
most feared result of the aging process.

The fear of financial impoverishment in old age is not without
foundation and "[tihe greatest single threat to the financial security
of the elderly is the cost of long-term care." ' 3 According to the American Geriatrics Society, "although there are gaps in acute care coverage under Medicare, it is the absence of coverage for long-term care
that is the genuine catastrophe for our older, more vulnerable patients. ' ' 4 This threat also extends to the families of long-term care con*
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1. See generally Hurd, The Economic Status of the Elderly, Science, May 12, 1989, at
659, 663.
2. Since advanced age is the single biggest risk factor for use of long-term care services,
and since women on the whole outlive men, the majority of long-term care consumers are
female. See STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., AGING
AMERICA: TRENDS AND PROJECTONS 10 (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter AGING AMERICA];
Kane & Kane, Long-Term Care, in GERIATRIC MEDICINE 648-53 (2d ed. 1990). Thus, in this
Article female pronouns will be used to refer to long-term care consumers or potential
consumers.
3. Schechter, Health Insurance, in THE MERCK MANUAL OF GERIAuRICs 1208 (1990)
[hereinafter THE MERCK MANuAL]; see also SELECT STAFF OF HousE Comm. ON AGING, 100H
CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON LONG TERM CARE AND PERSONAL IMPOVERISHMENT: SEVEN IN
TEN ELDERLY LIVING ALONE ARE AT RISK (Comm. Print 1987).

4.

AMERICAN GERIATRICS SOC'Y, PUBLIC FINANCING OF CATASTROPHIC CARE FOR THE
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sumers.5 Increased expressions of widespread public dissatisfaction with
the ways in which long-term care is financed 6 has led to a serious reappraisal of the status quo and calls for reform of the current longterm care marketplace. (It would be a misnomer to label the present
American long-term care situation as a "system.")
This Article analyzes some considerations relevant to the emerging
debate over long-term care financing in the United States. Part I describes the demographic imperative that has compelled the attention
of public policymakers, and Part II describes the current long-term
care marketplace. Part III presents some of the reasons that long-term
care financing has not been addressed more comprehensively until now.
Part IV summarizes the more prominent proposals for long-term care
that have been set forth recently, including the 1990 Pepper Commission Report. 7 Finally, the Article suggests several specific implications of the long-term care financing issue for students and
practitioners of the law.
I.

The Demographic Imperative"

Since surging demographics are the driving force behind the reexamination and reformation of the American long-term care financing situation, 9 any analysis of this topic must begin with a brief
review of population data.' 0 The elderly, the population segment that
is most at risk for needing long-term care services, is growing exponentially. In 1900, only twenty-five percent of the population lived
beyond the age of sixty-five years, compared with seventy percent in
1985 (with thirty percent living beyond eighty). In 1900, persons age
sixty-five and older made up four percent of the population, compared
with twelve percent in 1985, of whom forty percent are at least seventyOLDER PATIENT

(1987); see also

SELECT STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON AGING,

101ST CONG., 2D

SEss., REPORT ON MEDICARE AND MEDICAID'S 25TH ANNIVERSARY-MUCH PROMISED, ACCOMPLISHED, AND LEFT UNFINISHED 32 (Comm. Print 1990) (without long-term care protection,

families will face both extreme emotional and financial burden).
5. Mechanic, Challenges in Long-Term Care Policy, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1987, at 22,
29.
6. McConnell, Who Cares About Long-Term Care?: A Review of National Opinion
Surveys, GENERATIONS, Spring 1990, at 15.
7. A CALL FOR ACTION: FINAL REPORT OF THE PEPPER COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE
HEALTH CARE, S. Prt. 101-114 (1990) [hereinafter PEPPER REPORT].
8. See generally AGING AMERICA, supra note 2 (comprehensive statistical analysis of
America's older population).
9. Pawlson, Financing Long-Term Care: The Growing Dilemma, 37 J. AM. GERIATRICS

SoC'Y 631, 631-32 (1989).
10. See generally M. KAPP, GERIATRICS AND THE LAW ch. 1 (2d ed. currently at press);
Cassel & Brody, Demography, Epidemiology, and Aging, in GERIATRIC MEDICINE, supra note
2, at 16.
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five years old (expected to increase to fifty percent by the year 2000).
The "oldest old," those older than eighty-five, are the fastest growing
segment of both the general and the elderly population." Further re-

ductions in cardiovascular mortality are expected to lead to continued
increases in life expectancy.' 2
In 1990 the United States population included 31.3 million people
over the age of sixty-five and this number is expected to rise to 50.3
million by the year 2020." As the population of older people grows,

so do both the national need for and expenditures on long-term care
services.'4 Although only a small percentage of the elderly receive longterm care at any particular point in time-on the typical day, only
4.6% of the elderly reside in nursing homes' 5-the identity of that
population is changing constantly.'6 Hence, the number of older persons who may need long-term care services at some point in their lives
is sizable. In 1990, 2.3 million people will be. in a nursing home at
some time during the year and this figure is projected to increase to
4.0 million by 2020.' Researchers at the federal Agency for Health
Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) estimate that more than one-half
of the women and almost one-third of the men turning sixty-five in
1990 will spend some time in a nursing home before they die, and that
seven out of ten couples now reaching sixty-five can expect at least
one partner to be placed in a nursing home.' 8 Four million people will
11.
Q. 177,
12.
note 3,
13.
(1988).
14.
15.
7.
16.

Rosenwaike, A DemographicPortraitof the Oldest Old, 63 MILANK MEMORiAL FUND
187-88 (1985).
Brody & Persky, Epidemiology and Demographics, in THE MERCK MANUAL, supra
at 1115-17.
A. RiLvN & J. WIENER, CARING FoR THE DISABLED ELDERLY: WHO WILL PAY? 10
See Wetle, Social Issues, in THE MERCK MANUAL, supra note 3, at 1127.
Wiener, Which Way for Long-Term-CareFinancing?, GENERATIONS, Spring 1990, at
UNITED STATES PUB. HEALTH SERV., NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, E. HING,

USE OF NtRSING HoMEs By TH ELDERLY: PRELIMINARY DATA FROM THE 1985 NATIONAL
NURSING HOME SURvEY, No. 135. DHHS Pub. No. (PHS) 87-1250 (May 14, 1987) [hereinafter
1985 NURSING HomE USE] (advance data from vital and health statistics); cf. Shapiro & Tate,
Who Is Really at Risk of Institutionalization?, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 237 (1988) (identifying the
probability of institutionalization in the short and long terms for elderly persons with various
high-risk characteristics); Wingard, Jones & Kaplan, Institutional Care Utilization by the
Elderly: A Critical Review, 27 GERONTOLOGIST 156 (1987) (discussing estimates of institutionalized cases). Compare McConnel, A Note on the Lifetime Risk of Nursing Home Residency,
24 GERONTOLOGIST 193 (1984) (traditional five percent estimate of elderly living in nursing
homes on a given day is too low) with Liang & Tu, Estimating Lifetime Risk of Nursing
Home Residency: A FurtherNote, 26 GERONTOLOGIST 560 (1986) (much lower estimates than
McConnel).
17. 1985 NURSING HOME USE, supra note 16.
18. Otten, Nursing Homes Factor into More Futures, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1990, at Bl,
col. 2.
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receive home care services during at least part of 1990 and this figure
is projected to increase to 6.4 million by 2020.19

Someone will have to provide and pay for these services. Before
considering these pressing questions, the next section briefly describes
how the current marketplace in the United States satisfies and finances
20
long-term care.
II.

The Current Long-Term Care Marketplace

Long-term care consists of diagnostic, preventive, therapeutic,
and supportive services designed to help individuals compensate for
severe, chronic physical and mental disabilities and functional impairments. 2' These services currently consume more than eight percent
of the nation's health care dollars, 22 and may be divided roughly into
two categories: institutional and community-based.
A.

Institutional Services

The average person probably thinks of long-term care as institutional, or what is more commonly known as nursing home services.
As of 1990, there were over 15,000 licensed nursing homes in the United
States with more than 1.6 million beds 23 and an average occupancy
of ninety-two percent, or nearly 1.5 million residents at any time. 24
The nursing home industry has burgeoned in the quarter century since
enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs .25
The average annual cost for nursing home care in the United States
exceeds $29,000.26 Total nursing home and home care expenditures for
19. Id. Although this Article concentrates on the elderly, financing long-term care is by
no means an issue that directly affects older persons exclusively. Chronically disabled persons
of all ages are consumers of long-term care services. See, e.g., UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, HOME CARE ExPERmENCES OF FAMILIS WITH CHRONICALLY ILL CHILDREN, GAO/HRD89-73, at 20-25 (June 1989); Aday, Wegener, Andersen & Aitken, Home Carefor VentilatorAssisted Children, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1989, at 137; Lusk, Who's Knocking Now?: New
Clientele for Nursing Homes, GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING, June 1990, at 8. Indeed, commentators have called for coalition-building between the aging and disability movements based on
the common care needs of their respective constituencies. Zola, Aging, Disability and the
Home-Care Revolution, 71 ARciVEs PHYSICAL MED. & REHAB. 93 (1990).
20. For more complete descriptions of the long-term care industry, see, e.g., R.A. KANE
& R.L. KANE, LONG-TERM CARE: PRINCIPLES, PROGRAMS, AND POLICIES (1987).
21. Somers, Insurancefor Long-Term Care: Some Definitions, Problems, and Guidelines
for Action, NEw ENG. J. MED., July 2, 1987, at 23.
22. Welling, The Sickening Spiral, Barron's, June 11, 1990, at 8, 20.
23. MARION LABORATORIES, MARION LONG-TERM CARE DIGEST, NURSING HOME EDITION 6
(1989) [hereinafter NURsING HoME DIGEsT].
24. Id. at 15. A recent report by the Massachusetts Hospital Association found that nearly
1800 hospital patients in that state were waiting placement in a nursing home. Currents: LongTerm Care, HOSPITALS, Apr. 5, 1990, at 21.
25. See NURSING HOME DIGEST, supra note 23, at 4.
26. Wiener, supra note 15, at 5; see also Wiener & Hanley, The Bumpy Road to Long-
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the elderly were an estimated $42 billion in 1989, with eighty-two percent of the total going to institutional care. 27
Medicare, 28 the federal social insurance program that constitutes

the primary source of public health care financing for acute medical
services for the elderly, 29 occupies a very small niche in long-term care,
accounting for less than three percent of total nursing home expendituresA0 Part A of Medicare, Hospital Insurance,' pays for care for

up to one hundred days in a skilled nursing facility (SNF), 32 subject

to a coinsurance payment of $74 per day for days twenty-one to one
33
hundred in a skilled nursing facility, as of January 1, 1990.
Eligibility for Medicare coverage is strictly defined by law and
narrowly construed by the federal Health Care Financing Adminis4
tration (HCFA).1
To qualify for Medicare coverage, the patient's physician must
certify the need for and receipt of acute skilled nursing or rehabilitation services. Skilled care is defined as care that can be performed

Term CareReform, CAING, Mar. 1990, at 12 (the annual cost of a nursing home stay averages
$25,000).
27. Wiener, supra note 15, at 5.
28. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290 (1965) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26, 42 & 45 U.S.C.).
29. Schechter, supra note 3, at 1201-02.
30. Wiener, supra note 15, at 5; see also Rice & Gabel, Protecting the Elderly Against
High Health Care Costs, HALTH Ass., Fall 1986, at 5, 7-9.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1988); see J. KAUSKOPF, ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING 435-36 (1983)
(discussing Medicare Part A requirements).
32. The distinction between skilled nursing and intermediate care facilities was partially
abolished on October 1, 1990, when both kinds of institutions became nursing facilities (NFs)
for Medicaid eligibility purposes.
33. BROOKDALE CENTER ON AGING OF HuNTER COLLEGE, INST. ON LAW AND RIGiTS OF
OLDER ADuTs, BENEIrs & ENTrrIMENT INTo. BULL. (Jan. 1990). The patient is responsible
for paying the coinsurance portion.

34.

NAT'L SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, NUEsING

HoME

LAW:

A

LEGAL SERVICES

PRACTICE MANUAL 7-9 (1982); Cogen, Medicare Coverage in the Nursing Home, 37 J. AM.
GmUATRcs Soc'y 774 (1989); Cogen, Medicare Coverage in the Skilled Nursing Facility, J.
LONG-TERm CARE ArmN., Fall 1989, at 18; see also Liu, Recent Changes in the Medicare
Skilled Nursing Facility Benefit, GENERATIONS, Spring 1990, at 75 (discussing changes enacted
as part of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat.
683 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 26 & 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Medicare Catastrophic
Act]. These changes subsequently were repealed by Pub. Law No. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979
(1989) (codified in scattered sections of 26 & 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Medicare Catastrophic
Act Repealed]). Notably, the Medicare skilled nursing facility benefit would have been expanded
somewhat under the now-repealed Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA). See Medicare
Catastrophic Act, supra, as repealed by Medicare Catastrophic Act Repealed, supra; see also
Nemore, The New Medicare SNF Benefit: Protectingthe Intended Beneficiaries, 23 CLEAINcHOUSE REv. 404 (1989) (special issue on elder law) (discussing the Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act and other relevant statutes, cases, regulations, and administrative agency policy
issuances regarding the Medicare SNF benefit).
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only by or under the supervision of licensed nurses or professional
therapists pursuant to a doctor's orders." If these services are required
intermittently rather than every day or if they can be provided outside
of the facility, they are not paid for by Medicare Part A.3 6 Most importantly, Medicare Part A does not cover services that do not demonstrably improve the patient's condition, that is, when the patient
37
has stabilized and care is only "custodial" in nature.
The primary source of public funding for nursing home care is
Medicaid, a state health care financing program supplemented by federal financial participation. 8 Medicaid accounts for about forty percent of all nursing home reimbursement and eighty percent of all
government spending for nursing home and home care.3 9 Forty-one
percent of elderly individuals discharged from nursing homes and fortynine percent of elderly nursing home residents rely on Medicaid as
their primary source of payment.4n Experts estimate that by the year
2040, the Medicaid program could be paying as much as $56 billion
4
a year for nursing home care. '
A fundamental characteristic of the Medicaid program (unlike
Medicare, which is generally characterized as a social insurance scheme)
is its welfare nature. Individual eligibility for Medicaid coverage 42 is
predicated on a strict financial means test; the individual must demonstrate that her income and other resources are insufficient to meet
the costs of necessary medical services. 43 In 1990, single individuals
generally did not qualify for Medicaid if they had liquid assets of more
than $2,000, excluding the value of their home. 44 To qualify, patients
35. 42 C.F.R. § 409.31 (1989).
36. 42 C.F.R. § 409.31 (1989).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (1988).
38.
also

J.

Id.

§

1396; see NATIONAL SENIOR CITZENs LAW CENTER, supra note 34, at 9-14; see

TILLY, STATE FLEXIBILITY IN IMPLEMENTING

MEDICAID'S LONG-TERM

CARE PROGRAM

(AARP Public Pol'y Inst. Pol'y Brief May 1990); Hamme, Long-Term Care Reimbursement
Issues, in 1990 HEALTH L. HANDBOOK 345-57 (A. Gosfield ed. 1990).
39. Wiener, supra note 15, at 6. The Medicaid numbers may increase in the future as a
result of the June 14, 1990, United States Supreme Court decision in Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.
Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990), which gave hospitals and nursing homes the right to sue state
officials under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to force them to provide
adequate reimbursement for Medicaid services. Bacon, Hospitals Win Ruling on Medicaid,
Wall St. J., June 15, 1990, at BI, col. 3.
40. Wiener, supra note 15, at 6.
41. Schneider & Guralnik, The Aging of America: Impact on Health Care Costs, 263 J.
A.M.A. 2335, 2337-2338 (1990).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1988). On Medicaid eligibility, see generally I. SCHNEIDER & E.
HUBER, FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR LONG-TERM CARE: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS, CAREGIVERS AND
CONSUMERS 123-74 (1989).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (West Supp. 1990).
44. PEPPER REPORT, supra note 7, at 102.
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also must contribute all of their income to help pay for their care, after
deducting a small allowance of about $30 per month for personal needs,
uncovered medical expenses, and maintenance of a community spouse. 45
Thus, middle class nursing home residents must "spend down" their
personal assets and income before they can qualify for Medicaid coverage, 46 a simple task in light of the cost of nursing home care. This
incentive, indeed necessity, to achieve virtual impoverishment 47 is the
seed of substantial public discontent with the current long-term care
financing apparatus. This is the case even though portions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, 4 which were not subsequently repealed, extended certain financial protections to the community-based
spouse of an institutionalized Medicaid recipient.4 9
Individual states have experimented with a variety of reimbursement methods for nursing home care under their respective Medicaid
programs.5 0 States' plans vary on whether they provide retrospective
45. Carpenter, Medicaid Eligibility for Persons in Nursing Homes, HEALTH CARE FIN.
REv., Winter 1988, at 67; Pear, Patients Facing Increased Costs for Nursing Homes, N.Y.
Times, March 13, 1988, at 1, col. 2; see also Barreira, Despite Medicaid TransferRestrictions,
the Home May Still Be Kept in the Family, 17 ESTATE PLANNING 102 (1990).
46. Burwell, Adams & Meiners, Spend-Down of Assets Before MedicaidEligibility Among
Elderly Nursing-Home Recipients in Michigan, 28 MED. CAREc349 (1990).
47. There is significant debate and inconsistent data over the extent and rate of actual
impoverishment associated with qualifying for Medicaid long-term care benefits. Compare
Weiner, Hanley & Harris, Letter: Nursing Home Care: Still a Routine Catastrophe, 30
GERONTOLOGIST 417 (1990) (there is virtually no protection against catastrophic nursing home
costs-directly refuting Moses) and Liu & Manton, The Effect of Nursing Home Use on
Medicaid Eligibility, 29 GERoNToLoGisT 59 (1989) (in contrast to persons who did not use
nursing homes, persons who entered nursing homes had a four to five times greater risk of
spending-down to Medicaid eligibility) with Liu, Doty, & Manton, Medicaid Spenddown in
Nursing Homes, 30 GERONTOLOGIsT 7 (1990) (perception that a large percentage of nursing
home patients spend down their savings is not supported by recent survey data) and Moses,
The Fallacy of Impoverishment, 30 GERoNToLoGIST 21 (1990) (describing research that casts
doubt on the belief that Medicaid requires impoverishment-the magnitude of asset spenddown is much smaller than once believed). See also Branch, Friedman, Cohen, Smith &
Socholitzky, Impoverishing the Elderly: A Case Study of the FinancialRisk of Spend-Down
Among MassachusettsElderly People, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 648 (1988). For a discussion of actual
impoverishment versus intentional asset divestiture or sheltering to become eligible for public
benefits, see infra note 190 and accompanying text.
48. See Medicare Catastrophic Act, supra note 34; Medicare Catastrophic Act Repealed,
supra note 34.
49. On the Medicare Catastrophic Care Act's protections against spousal impoverishment,
see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-5 (West Supp. 1990); Finberg & Schwartz, Implementation of the
Medicaid Provisionsof the Medicare CatastrophicCoverageAct, 23 CLEAPINGHOUSE REv. 370,
373-75 (1989) (special issue on elder law).
50. Butler & Schlenker, Case-Mix Reimbursement for Nursing Homes: Objectives and
Achievement, 67 MILBArK Q. 103 (1989); Cohen & Dubay, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement Method and Ownership on Nursing Home Costs, Case Mix, and Staffing, INQUiRY,
Summer 1990, at 183-200; Holahan & Cohen, Nursing Home Reimbursement: Cost, Quality,
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or prospective cost reimbursement and whether they base ceilings on
facility or area characteristics. The states' plans also differ in the height
of the ceilings set, and in the provision of inflation adjustments, efficiency incentives, 5' patient outcome-related rates,5 2 as well as in their
treatment of real property costs. 3
Nursing home patients, often assisted by their families, fund much
of the cost of their own care out-of-pocket prior to qualifying for
Medicaid coverage. Nationally, about one-half of the nursing home
resident population is on private-pay status.14 Daily rates are set on
a free market, what-the-traffic-will-bear basis. Out-of-pocket spending
accounts for almost fifty-seven percent of nursing home care." It also
accounts for eighteen percent of all out-of-pocket spending for health
care. 6 In 1985, nursing home expenses equaled 82.5% of the out-ofpocket expenditures among those elderly who spent $3,000 or more
on health services.57 Largely because of this incentive to "spend down,"
the average elder today spends more personal money, both in absolute
dollars and as a percentage of income, on total health care than she
did prior to the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.58 At
and Access Trade-Offs, GENERATIONS, Spring 1990, at 59, 63. See generally S. EASTAUGH,
FINANCING HEALTH CARE: ECONomIC EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY 186-90 (1987) (Increasingly

attention has turned to the need for private insurance funds to support long term care.
California insurance companies have targeted wealthy and middle class residents who were
capable of paying premiums.).
51. See B. JONES & M. MEINERS, NURSING HomE DISCHARGES: THE RESULTS OF AN
INCENTrVE REIMBURSEMENT EXPERIOMNT, DHHS Pub. No. (PHS) 86-3399 (Aug. 1986); M.
MEINERS, P. THORBURN, P. RODDY & B. JONES, NURSING HOME ADMISSIONS: THE RESULTS OF
AN INCENTIVE REMURSEMENT EXPERIMENT,

DHHS Pub. No. (PHS) 86-3397 (Oct. 1985); P.

TI)oRBuRN & M. MEINERS, NURSING HOME PATIENT OUTcOMEs: THE RESULTS OF AN INCENTIVE

DHHS Pub. No. (PHS) 86-3400 (Aug. 1986).
52. This concept assumes that the sicker a facility's residents are, the costlier it will be
to care for them properly. Thus, reimbursement would be higher for caring for sicker residents,
assuming outcomes in terms of health and functioning meet reasonable expectations. For a
brief description of New York State's Resource Utilization Groupings (RUGs) methodology,
which is a case-mix formula analogous to Diagnosis Related Groups for acute care hospitals,
see Feather & Karuza, The Funding of Nursing Home Care, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF
NURSING HOME CARE 15, 18-19 (1989); see also Kane, Rethinking Long-Term Care, 38 J. AM.
GERIATRICS Soc'Y 704, 706-08 (1990) (calling for nursing home reimbursement based on the
ratio of achieved/expected outcomes).
53. See generally P. BUTLER, PUBLIC REIMBURSEMENT OF NURSING HoMES-A TECHICAL
REIMBURSEMENT EXPERIENT,

GUIDE FOR RESIDENT ADVOCATES, (Research Inst. on Legal Assistance, Legal Services Corp.

1980).
54. Eubanks, Trends: Long-Term Care: Nursing Homes See Little Relief in Coming Years,
HOSPITALS, Apr. 20, 1990, at 110, 112.
55. Wiener, supra note 15, at 6.
56. Levit, Freeland & Waldo, National Health Care Spending Trends, HEALTH ASP.,
Summer 1990, at 171, 181.
57. Rice, The Use, Cost, and Economic Burden of Nursing-Home Care in 1985, 27 MED.
CARE 1133 (1989).
58. STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 101ST CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON
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present, private third-party insurance pays only about one percent of
total nursing home expenditures. 59 The slowness of the private insurance industry to make a meaningful impact on the long-term care marketplace, and the potential for and limitations on expansion of this
sector, are discussed below. 60
The federal Department of Veterans Affairs (formerly the Ve-

terans Administration) also provides nursing home financing. 1 In 1990,
approximately fifty percent of elderly American men were eligible for
veterans' benefits. 62 The system operates 172 nursing homes and 27

domiciliary facilities (as well as providing acute care inpatient services
and 226 outpatient clinics) and also pays for contract care delivered
6
in community nursing homes to eligible beneficiaries.
B. Non-Institutional Services

One of the major weaknesses of public policy in this arena has
been the failure to address adequately the financing of non-institutional alternatives *for long-term care. L. Gregory Pawlson, past
.president of the American Geriatrics Society, acknowledged this failure: "Long-term care services are-in the midst of evolution, if not
revolution. The combination of housing, nutrition, nursing, and
health care services that comprise long-term care have taken a variety
of forms other than traditional nursing home or home care." 4 Innovations in the form of adult day care, 65 continuing or life care
EMPTYING TI ELDERLY'S PocKxmooK-GRowING IMeACT OF RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS 2331 (Comm. Print 1990) (health and long-term care costs are absorbing ever larger percentages
of elderly income); STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
ON AMERICA's ELDERLY AT RISK (Comm. Print 1985) (1985 is the first year in which the elderly
will spend more of their income on health care than they did when Medicare and Medicaid
began); cf. Prescription Drugs and the Elderly: The High Cost of Growing Old: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987) (statement of John
Melcher, Chairman) (three-fourths of the health care costs of older Americans are for
prescription drugs; between 1980 and 1986 these costs increased by 80%; none of these costs
are covered by Medicare).
59. Wiener, supra note 15, at 5.
60. See infra notes 194-213 and accompanying text.
61.

See AMERICAN GERATIucs SocTYr, THE ROLE OF THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION IN

Tmn CARE OFaTHE ELDERLY (1987).
62. Schechter, supra note 3, at 1207.
63. Achenbaum, The VA's Geriatric Challenge, 10(4) AM. Soc'Y AGING CONNECTION 3
(1990).
64. Pawlson, supra note 9, at 633.
65. See Beck, A Home Away from Home, NEWSWEEK, July 2, 1990, at 56-58; see also
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE AGING, STANDARDS FOR ADULT DAY CARE (Fall 1984); Cherry &
Rafkin, Adapting Day Care to the Needs of Adults with Dementia, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 116
(1988); Richards & Hepburn, Development of a Quality Assurance Program in a Medical
Model Adult Day Health Care Center, 15 QuArrv Rav. BULL. 81 (1989). See generally
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE AGING, ADULT DAY CARE: ANNOTATED

(compiled by B. Ransom & B. Dugan).

BIBLIOGRAPHY (1987)
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communities, 66 respite care, 67 congregate living arrangements, board
69
and care homes, 68 social health maintenance organizations (SHMOs),
and hospices 70 are proliferating, but they need to be funded properly

to present viable alternatives or adjuncts to institutional placement.
Strong evidence indicates that most older persons with long term

health problems or functional impairments would prefer home care7'
or other community-based services over nursing homes, 72 and that physicians support expansion of home care options73 (even though some
74
of the economic data dispute the cost-effectiveness of such services).

The paucity of financing mechanisms for community-based services
66. See S. EASTAUGH, supra note 50, at 177-82; Netting & Wilson, Current Legislation
Concerning Life Care and Continuing Care Contracts, 27 GERONTOLOGIST 645 (1987); Stearns,
Netting & Wilson, Continuing Care Retirement Communities: Issues in State Regulation, 8 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 245 (1989); Stearns, Netting, Wilson & Branch, Lessons from the
Implementation of CCRC Regulation, 30 GERONTOLOGIST 154 (1990); Tell & Cohen, Continuing
Care Retirement Communities, GENERATIONS, Spring 1990, at 55.
67. UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESPITE CARE: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL,
SELECTED STATE, AND PRIVATE PROGRAMS, GAO/HRD-90-125 (Sept. 1990).

68.

See

AMERICAN ASS'N OF RETIRED PERSONS, PUB. POL'Y INST., PRESERVING INDEPEND-

ENCE, SUPPORTING NEEDS: Tim ROLE OF BOARD AND CARE HOMES (1989); see also Board and

Care: A Failure in Public Policy: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Aging, the
Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care, and the Subcomm. on Housing and Consumer
Interests of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (investigating
the attributes and problems of the board and care system in the United States, including the
lack of strong governmental involvement and regulation). National information is seriously
lacking concerning the number and types of board and care homes, their residents, and the
quality of services provided. See McCoy & Conley, Surveying Board and Care Homes: Issues
and Data Collection Problems, 30 GERONTOLOGIST 147 (1990).
69. See Ansak, The On-Lok Model: Consolidating Care and Financing, GENERATIONS,
Spring 1990, at 73 (reporting on a very successful SHMO); S. EASTAUGH, supra note 50, at
196-98; Harrington & Newcomer, Social Health Maintenance Organizations as Innovative
Models to Control Costs, GENERATIONS, Spring 1990, at 49; Leutz, Abrahams, Greenlick,
Kane & Prottas, Targeting Expanded Care to the Aged: Early SHMO Experience, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 4 (1988).
70. See Rhymes, Hospice Care in America, 264 J. A.M.A. 369 (1990); see also S.
EASTAUGH, supra note 50, at 194-96.
71. Home health care is "[h]ealth services provided in the homes of the elderly, disabled,
sick, or convalescent. The types of services provided include nursing care, social services, home
health aide and homemaker services, and various rehabilitation therapies (e.g., speech, physical,
and occupational therapy)." NATIONAL INST. ON AGING, AGE WORDS: A GLOSSARY ON HEALTH
AND AGING, NIH Pub. No. 86-1849, at 49 (1986). In this Article, the phrase "home care"
will be used to emphasize the non-medical, as well as the medical, component of services
needed in the older individual's own home.
72. AMERICAN ASS'N OF RETIRED PERSONS, UNDERSTANDING SENIOR HOUSING FOR THE
1990s: AN AARP SURVEY OF CONSUMER PREFERENCES, CONCERNS AND NEEDS (1990); A. RrVLIN
& J. WIENER, supra note 13, at 198.
73. American Med. Ass'n Council on Sci. Affairs, Home Care in the 1990s, 263 J.
A.M.A. 1241 (1990).
74. See Weissert, Strategiesfor Reducing Home Care Expenditures, GENERATIONS, Spring
1990, at 42.
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is generally blamed for a substantial part of the senior citizen backlash
leading to repeal of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act75 and for

failure of the private insurance industry to capture more than a negligible slice of the potential long-term care market.
Most home care services in the United States are provided today

on an informal, non-paid basis by family members (chiefly 6 wives,
daughters, and daughters-in-law) 77 and friends of the older long-term
care consumer. Despite the non-paid nature of the care, the provision

of informal home care has real economic costs in terms of both income
opportunities foregone both by the caregiver 7 and measurable physical
79
and emotional toUs.
Many older persons do not have family or friends to assist them
in day-to-day living.80 For this population sub-group, the availability
of professional home care services may be particularly crucial in avoiding or postponing institutionalization.8 1 In 1990, there were almost
75. See Medicare Catastrophic Act, supra note 34; Medicare Catastrophic Act Repealed,
supra note 34.
76. But see L. KAYE & J. APPLEGATE, MEN AS CAREaranS TO THE ELDERLY: UNDERSTANDING AND AIDING UNRECOGNIED FAmnx SUPPORT (1990); Montgomery & Datwyler, Women &
Men in the Caregiving Role, GENERATIONS, Summer 1990, at 34; Stoller, Males as Helpers:
The Role of Sons, Relatives, and Friends, 30 GEROTOLOGIST 228 (1990).
77. SUBcoMM. ON HUMAN SERV. OF HOUSE SELECr COMM. ON AGING, 101ST CONG., 2D
Sass., POUCY FoRum ON SHARING THE CARING: OPTIONS FOR THE 90s AND BEYOND 3 (Comm.
Print 1990); SUBcoMM. ON HumAN SERV. OF HOUSE Coma. ON AGING, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
STUDY ON EXPLODING Tm MYTHS: CAREGIVING IN AMERICA 18 (Comm. Print 1990); Beck, Be
Nice to Your Kids, NEwswEai, Mar. 12, 1990, at 72; Beck, Trading Places, NEWSWEEK, July
16, 1990, at 48 (discussing the "daughter track": working, raising children, and helping aging
parents); Brody, Women in the Middle and Family Help to Older People, 21 GERorrOLoGIsT
471 (1981); Penning, Receipt of Assistance by Elderly People: HierarchicalSelection and Task
Specificity, 30 GERONTOLOGIST 220 (1990); Stone, Cafferata & Sangi, Caregivers of the Frail
Elderly: A NationalProfile, 27 GERONTOLOGIST 616 (1987); Wetle, supra note 14, at 1128; cf.
Post, Women and Elderly Parents: Moral Controversy in an Aging Society, 5 HYPATIA 83
(1990).
78. Stone & Short, The Competing Demands of Employment and Informal Caregiving to
Disabled Elders, 28 MED. CARE 513-26 (1990).

79. See Gallagher, Caregivers of Chronically 11 Elders, in

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AGING

89 (G. Maddox ed. 1987); Barusch, Problems and Coping Strategies of Elderly Spouse
Caregivers, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 677 (1988); Huston, Family Care of the Elderly and Caregiver
Stress, 42 AM. FA~mLY PHYSICIAN 671-76 (1990); Scharlach, Role Strain in Mother-Daughter
Relationships in Later Life, 27 GERONTOLOGIST 627 (1987); Schulz, Visintainer & Williamson,
Psychiatricand PhysicalMorbidity Effects of Caregiving, 45 J. GERONTOLOGY 181 (1990). But
see Reed, Stone & Neale, Effects of Caringfor a Demented Relative on Elders' Life Events
and Appraisals, 30 GERONTOLOGIST 200 (1990) (preliminary data fail to demonstrate a global
disruption of caregivers' activities).
80. See J. KASPER, AGING ALONE: PROFLES AND PROJECTIONS 62-64 (1988) (a report of
the Commonwealth Fund Commission on elderly people living alone) (18% of elderly people
living alone say they have no one to turn to for a few days); see also Hays, Aging and Family
Resources: Availability and Proximity of Kin, 24 GERONTOLOGIST 149 (1984).
81. D. ROWLAND, HELP AT Homm: LONG-TER CARE ASSISTANCE FOR IMPAIRED ELDERLY
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82
6,000 Medicare-certified home health agencies in the United States.
The rapid proliferation of such agencies over the last decade represents
a competitive marketplace responding to a burgeoning demand for
these services.
Part A of Medicare provides closely circumscribed home care benefits for eligible persons over age sixty-five.83 Reflecting a solid medical
or non-custodial model, payment is made only if the following four
conditions are met: (a) the care needed includes part-time or intermittent skilled nursing services, physical therapy, or speech therapy;
(b) the patient is confined to home; (c) the physician certifies that
home health care is needed; and (d) the agency providing the care is
certified for quality purposes by Medicare. 84 Fiscal intermediaries (FIs),
who are under contract to the federal Health Care Financing Administration to review claims, strictly enforce these limitations.8 5
Medicaid also provides some coverage for home care services on
a financial means-tested eligibility basis.8 6 Home-delivered services reimbursable under Medicaid include: nursing services provided by a
home health agency or registered nurse; medical supplies, equipment,
and appliances; and physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech
pathology, and audiology services provided by a licensed practi87
tioner.
PEOPLE 5 (1989) (a report of the Commonwealth Fund Commission on elderly people living
alone); Comment, Long Term Home Health Care for the Elderly: Greater Access-Better
Care?, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 371, 372-73 (1989) (authored by Albert R. Meyer).
82. MEDICARE'S HoME HEALTH BENEFIT: ELIGIBILITY, UTILIZATION & EXPENDITUREs, ISSUE
BRIEF, AARP Pub. Pol'y Inst., at 1 (1991). For a description of home care services provided
outside of formal home health agencies, see Kapp, Improving Choices Regarding Home Care
Services: Legal Impediments and Empowerments, 10 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. Rav.
(forthcoming Mar. 1991); see also C. SABATINO, LESSONS FROM ENHANCING CONSUMER-DnaCTED
APPROACHES IN HOME CARE, ABA Comm'n on Legal Problems of the Elderly (1990). For
general background on the home care marketplace, see S. EASTAUGH, supra note 50, at 19094.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 409.41 (1987); see J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note
31, at 436-37; Comment, supra note 81, at 373-75; see also Tsung, Trends in Medicare Home
Health Benefits-A Chartbook, Pub. Pol'y Inst., AARP, no. H-12 (Oct. 1990).
84. For Medicare Home Health Agency (HHA) certification standards, see 42 C.F.R. §
484 (1989). See also UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: ASSURING THE
QUALITY OF HOME HEALTH SERVICES, GAO/HRD-90-7 (Oct. 10, 1989). For voluntary standards
for HHAs, see JOINT COMM'N ON THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS. (JCAHO),
STANDARDS FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF HOME CARE (1990).
85. UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: INCREASED DENIALS OF HOME
HEALTH CLAIMS DURING 1986 AND 1987, GAO/HRD-90-14BR (Jan. 24, 1990); see also P.
KOmLos-HROBSKY, AN ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO HOME CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 36-43 (1988); cf.
UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: COMPARISON OF Two METHODS OF
COMPUTING HOME HEALTH CARE COST LIMITs, GAO/HRD-90-167 (Sept. 28 1990).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(7) (1988); see P. Komuos-HROBSKY, supra note 85, at 44-53.
87. 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b) (1987).
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A number of states expand public funding for home care services,
88
especially those provided by homemakers and home health aides.

This expansion is financed in one of two ways: either with a Medicaid
Home and Community-Based Waiver 89 that allows Medicaid dollars
(which are partially derived from the federal government) to be used
for supportive, rather than purely medical services; or state money

separately appropriated for this purpose through line item legislation. 9°
Excellent examples of state innovation in this area include Ohio's

PASSPORT, 9' Oregon's Project Independence (OPI), 92 California's
In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS), 93 and New York's Nursing Home
Without Walls 94 initiatives. 95

Home care consumers and their families also pay for these services out of private funds when eligibility for public funding is not
available or when cost-sharing is imposed. 96 Small home care agencies
are more likely to rely on private-pay patients than are larger agencies. 97 The impact of private third-party insurance for home care has
been negligible, as has been public or private third-party coverage for
88. For a description of the different levels of home care, see Kapp, supra note 82. A
homemaker or home health aide is "[a] person who is paid to help in the home with personal
care, light housekeeping, meal preparation, and shopping. Some states and agencies make a
distinction between homemaking (or housekeeping) services and personal care services." NAT'L
INST. ON AGING, supra note 71, at 50; see also Dejowski, Homemaker Services, in Tan
ENCYCLOPEDI, OF AGING, supra note 79, at 328; Yeatts, Capitman & Steinhardt, Evaluation
of Connecticut's Medicaid Community Care Waiver Program, 27 GERONTOLOGIST 652 (1987).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (1988) (generally known as "2176 waivers"). A bill introduced
by Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W. Va.), on April 13, 1989, entitled the "Medicaid Home and
Community Care Options Act of 1989," S. 785, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 3905
(1989), would have allowed states to provide services under Medicaid without a waiver that
are currently available only with a waiver. An "improved and strengthened" version of this
legislation was introduced on November 20, 1989. S. 1942, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
RPc. 16393 (1989) (quoting Senator Rockefeller). This legislation was finally passed as Section
4741 of the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388,
the "Medicaid Frail Elderly Amendments," effective November 1991.
90. Justice, State Community-Based Care Systems, GENERAaIONS, Spring 1990, at 45.
91. Ohio's PASSPORT program, a Medicaid waiver initiative that gives in-home alternatives to low income elderly who are eligible for nursing home placement, began as a
demonstration project and was expanded statewide effective 1991 as part of the legislature's
1990 Eldercare package. Omo Rv. CODE § 5111 (1990), amended substitute House Bill Ill
of the 118th Ohio General Assembly (1990).
92. ORE. Ray. STAT. §§ 410.410-.480 (1989).
93. CALrORIA DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVS. MANUAL -88, SERV. PROGRAM No. 7, IN-HoHE
SUPPORTIVE SERVICES ch. 300-767.11 (1987).
94. NEW YORK STATE SENATE HEALTH Comm., NURSING HOMES WITHOUT WALLS PROGRAM:
A DECADE OF QUALITY CARE FOR NY's AGED AND DISABLED (1989).
95. See C. SABATlo, supra note 82; Kapp, supra note 82.

96. See UNrrED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IN-HoME SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY:
COST SHARING EXPANDs RANGE OF SERVICES PROVIDED AND POPULATION SERVED, GAO/HRD90-19 (Oct. 23, 1989).
97. NURSING HoME DIGEST, supra note 23, at 27.
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other forms of community-based long-term care services. The Department of Veterans Affairs operates an extensive home care delivery
system, 98 but it is limited to eligible beneficiaries.
III.

Long-Term Care Financing: A Policy "Third Rail"?

It is only very recently that a comprehensive, universal, rational
system for financing long-term care services in the United States has
received meaningful attention, and the resulting serious proposals are
of relatively recent origin. As recently as 1983, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, in its seminal report on access to services, 99
avoided addressing long-term care by asserting that it was beyond its
purview.
As a point of reference, the United States is not alone in failing
to deal straightforwardly with the problem of funding long-term care
services. Other nations with comprehensive, universal systems for financing acute medical care handle long-term care outside of those systems.' ° Pamela Doty, a senior analyst with the federal Department
of Health and Human Services, has tried to dispel several prevalent
myths' 0' associated with comparisons of long-term care in the United
States with other countries, namely that: (a) other countries provide
comprehensive long-term care coverage along with acute care benefits
under their national health service or national health insurance programs; (b) the United States is the only country that bases access to
public long-term care coverage on a means test or that requires individuals to impoverish themselves by first exhausting their capacity
to pay privately for care; (c) long-term care service systems in other
advanced industrial countries are more integrated, rational, and less
fragmented than in the United States; and (d) other countries do a
better job than the United States of preventing or postponing insti98. See Cummings, Hughes, Weaver, Manheim, Conrad, Nash, Braun & Adelman, CostEffectiveness of Veterans Administration Hospital-BasedHome Care, 150 ARCHVES INTERNAL
MED. 1274 (1990).
99. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMED.
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE (1983).

100. Doty, Dispelling Some Myths: A Comparison of Long-Term-Care Financing in the
U.S. and Other Nations, GENERATIONS, Spring 1990, at 10.
101. For odes to the Canadian system see, for example, R.L. KANE & R.A. KANE, A WILL
AND A WAY: WHAT AMERICANS CAN LEARN ABOUT LONG-TERM CARE FROM CANADA (1985);

Kane & Kane, The Feasibility of Universal Long-Term Care Benefits: Ideasfrom Canada, 312
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1357 (1985); see also Berg, Branch, Doyle & Sundstrom, Institutional and
Home-Based Long-Term Care Alternatives: The 1965-1985 Swedish Experience, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 825 (1988).
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tutionalization through generous public funding of home and community-based alternatives.' °2
Why has long-term care financing traditionally been treated as a
virtual public policy "third rail," comparable to the electrified part
of a subway system whose mere touching leads to instant death? Several potential explanations for procrastination in squarely facing the
issue exist.
First, a significant portion of the citizenry only recently has begun
to understand the existence and extent of the problem. Publicity occasioned by the Congress' passing the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act in 1988,103 coupled with the dissatisfaction and controversy leading
to its repeal a year later, 4 helped to dispel the widely held notion
(particularly among senior citizens) that adequate public financing already was available to assure appropriate, high quality long-term care
services to all older persons. As the public grew aware of the inadequacy of the current long-term care marketplace, its often restrictive
choices,' 0 5 and the risk of personal impoverishment, public pressure
6
on policymakers to devote attention to the financing issue grew.'0
A second reason why many policymakers have failed to address
the problem adequately is that they consciously or subconsciously find
the subject of long-term care too amorphous to attack with sufficient
precision. It is a daunting task to define the field and determine with
the level of specificity demanded by a workable financing scheme what
particular services (for example, respite care, adult day care, home
personal care attendants) should qualify for inclusion or exclusion.
Acute care, with its general dependence on discrete medical procedures
and tests, appears much more manageable in this comparison.
The apparent amorphousness of the subject contributes to what
is probably the major reason that long-term care financing has been
treated gingerly, if at all: the apprehension of uncontrollable public
expenditures if entitlement eligibility is materially expanded. Policymakers recognize the existence of a substantial and legitimate, but
presently unmet, need for long-term care services. They also recognize
that the fear of incurring uncontained costs in meeting legitimate needs
will be alleviated only if effective, aggressive cost containment strat102.

Doty, supra note 100, at 10.

103. Medicare Catastrophic Act, supra note 34.
104. Medicare Catastrophic Act Repealed, supra note 34.
105. See, e.g., Kapp, Home Care Client-CenteredSystems: Consumer Choicevs. Protection,
GENERAioNs, Supp. 1990, at 33-35 (special issue on "Autonomy and Long-Term care Practice"); Kapp, Home Care Service Deliverers: Optionsfor Consumers, in Hoi, HEALTH CARE
OpTONs: A GumE FOR OLDER PERsONs AND CONCERNED FAsuaMS ch. 3 (1990).
106. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.
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egies are built directly into any expanded long-term care financing
system and are enforced stringently. The country's historic inability
to constrain the rise in expenditures for acute medical services is not
an encouraging precedent.
Fear concerning the potential "woodwork effect" or phenomenon
of "moral hazard" further increases policymakers' anxiety about uncontrollable economic costs accompanying an expansion of long-term
care benefits. 0 7 This insurance industry-developed concept posits that
once insurance coverage for a particular service is created, insureds
tend to take advantage of that benefit, often unnecessarily. 108
Put differently, the concept of moral hazard is based on the theory of induced demand; the supply (insurance coverage) creates more
demand (use of that coverage). In the context of long-term care, it
is hypothesized that many older individuals who now cope without
public financing, or who receive only minimal public financing to assist them, would "crawl out of the woodwork" and suddenly "need"
public financial assistance if it were more widely available. There is
particular worry about possible disappearance of informal, unpaid
care that presently is provided to elders by their families and friends,
in favor of reliance on newly available public financing for the same
services. 109
The potential economic incentive that expansion of public benefits
would create for family members and friends to discontinue their informal, unpaid care raises an important philosophical issue that acts
as yet another impediment to reform. Do not families have a distinct
moral obligation to make sacrifices to personally serve their older,
disabled loved ones within the broad, reasonable limits of their physical and financial abilities? Would expanding the availability of thirdparty financing for long-term care encourage families to shirk this
moral duty or, alternatively, to demand payment from the public coffers for services they are now providing gratis (in an economic sense)?
Should public policy contribute to such incentives?
On the other hand, are there not limits to the moral responsibilities of families toward their older, disabled members, and should
107. Beck, Be Nice to Your Kids, supra note 77, at 73 (discussing the possibility that even
more people would come out of the woodwork to seek assistance if it became available).
108. A. RrwIN & J. WIENER, supra note 13, at 66.
109. The concern about induced demand is more valid with respect to home care services,
which are preferred by most people, than for nursing home services, which most people try
to avoid. See Fama & Kennell, Should We Worry About Induced Demand for Long-Term
Care Services?, GENERATIONs, Spring 1990, at 37, 37-39 (induced demand for nursing home
services), 39-40 (induced demand for home care services); Wiener, supra note 15, at 8-9;
Weissart, Cready & Pawelak, The Past and Future of Home and Community Based LongTerm Care, 66 MIBANK Q. 309 (1988).
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not humane public policy acknowledge and support those limits? Progress in addressing the long-term care financing question will require
movement toward resolving some of these, and other, empirical and
philosophical issues surrounding the role of informal caregiving and
the impact of various financial incentives on it.
A third philosophically founded, politically charged impediment
to long-term care financing reform is the current controversy regarding
"intergenerational equity." 110 Personified in the lobbying group Americans for Generational Equity (AGE), proponents of the intergenerational equity movement claim that older persons already consume
more than their proportional share of available public resources, and
that other segments of society, particularly children, are being shortchanged as a result.' They argue that devoting further scarce public
funds to pay for services primarily benefitting the elderly would be
socially and economically foolish, and that public funds should be
redistributed away from health care for the elderly and toward2 health
care, housing, education, and other services for the young."
The political backlash against the elderly, which the AGE movement attempts to generate, has been abetted recently by the senior
citizen-inspired repeal of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act."'
The political fiasco surrounding this legislation has been portrayed
widely as the result of "greedy geezers" demanding preferential treatment in the form of expanded health care coverage for their special
interests while at the same time intransigently refusing to contribute
their fair share to finance those expanded services. Against this background, discussions of expanding long-term care financing, with the
4
elderly as primary beneficiaries, takes on a strained tone."
110. P. LONaMAN, BORN TO PAY: THE NEw PoLmcs OF AGING IN AmERICA (1987);
Longman, Justice Between Generations, ATi.. MoTrmxY, June 1985, at 73 (nearly 20% of

American children live in poverty, compared with 12% of the aged); Wessel, DemocratsFace
Scary Prospect of Agreeing to Siphon Benefits from Social Security Pot, Wall St. J., July 12,
1990, at A12, col. 1.
111. Salholz, Blaming the Voters, NEwswEEK, Oct. 29, 1990, at 36; Samuelson, Pampering
the Elderly, NEwswEEK, Oct. 29, 1990, at 61.
112. On the subject of intergenerational equity and the relative claims of the elderly on
public funds for health care, see generally D. CALLAHAN, SETTNG LuATS: MEDicAL GoALs IN
AN AoING Socmry (1987); Clark, The Social Allocation of Health Care Resources: Ethical
Dilemmas in Age-Group Competition, 25 GERONTOLoIS 119 (1985); Kapp, Health Care
Trade-Offs Based on Age: Ethically Confronting the "'R" Word, PHARos, Summer 1989, at
2; Wisensale, GenerationalEquity and IntergenerationalPolicies, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 773 (1988).
For an optimistic perspective, see Kingson, GenerationalEquity: An Unexpected Opportunity
to Broaden the Politics of Aging, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 765 (1988).
113. Medicare Catastrophic Act Repealed, supra note 34.
114. See Atkins, The Politics of Financing Long-Term Care, GENE ATIONS, Spring 1990,

at 19.
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Reform Proposals

Despite these impediments, dissatisfaction with the current longterm care marketplace and its financing" 5 has attracted the serious
attention of policymakers. The Long-Term Care Campaign, a coalition of one hundred forty national organizations dedicated to enacting comprehensive federal legislation on long-term care financing,
has sought to heighten public and policymaker consciousness in this
area." 6 A number of specific proposals for expanding the long-term
care financing system have been set before the public in the last few
years. A summary of some of the more prominent proposals" 7 and
an examination of their basic policy themes as well as a review of
future proposals follows.
Academic or think tank scholars have authored several leading
proposals. Karen Davis, a professor at Johns Hopkins University
School of Hygiene and Public Health (and former Assistant Secretary
for Planning and Evaluation of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services) and her colleague Diane Rowland, in one of the
boldest of these proposals to date, have suggested an integration of
financing for acute and long-term care for the elderly under Medicare." 8 Under their proposal, under Medicare Congress would enact
an elective long-term care plan that would cover skilled and custodial
nursing home care as well as home care services.1" 9 To avoid adverse
selection (i.e., only those persons at greatest risk of needing and using
the service choosing to enroll in the program) individuals would have
to enroll when they were between ages sixty and seventy, and benefits
could not be used until the individual had been enrolled for at least
five years. Individuals would be charged a ten percent coinsurance rate
subject to a maximum $3,000 out-of-pocket expenditure. Premiums
would be assessed at four percent of the individual's income. 120
The Brookings Institution has delivered a more recent proposal,
which has been attracting great attention. 121 This proposal uses so115. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
116. Long-Term Care Campaign, P.O. Box 27394, Washington, DC 20038.
117. See, e.g., Ball, Public-PrivateSolution to Protection Against the Cost of Long-Term
Care, 38 J. AM. GERIATRICS SoC'Y 156 (1990); Moon, Financing Long-Term Care, 66 BULL.
N.Y. AcAD. MED. 107 (1990); Pawlson & Mourey, Financing Long-Term Care: An InsuranceBased Approach, 38 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'y 696 (1990).
118. K. DAVIS & D. ROWLAND, MEDICARE POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HEALTH AND
LONG-TERM CARE (1986).
119. Id. at 110-18.
120. Id.
121. A. RIVLiN & J. WIENER, supra note 13.
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phisticated computer simulations to model different long-term care

financing options.'

2

Principal authors Alice Rivlin (former Director

of the Congressional Budget Office) and Joshua Wiener, both econ-

omists, ultimately recommend replacing Medicaid with a general social
insurance program that covers nursing home stays of longer than two
years and that purchases private long-term care insurance for the poor,

with private insurance or individual savings financing the first two
years of care for the non-poor.'2

In 1990, the Congressionally established' 24 United States Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive Health Care, formally renamed
the "Pepper Commission" in honor of Congressman Claude Pepper,'2 its first chairperson, issued its Recommendations to the Congress.'2 6 By an eleven to four vote,' 27 the Pepper Commission issued

a legislative plan with three major components to be phased in over
a four-year period: (a) unlimited public insurance coverage for home

and community-based care; (b) "front-end" coverage (the first three
months)'1 public insurance of nursing home care; and (c) a new Nursing Home Program (NHP) for the poor with benefits beginning with
29
the fourth month of nursing home placement.1

More specifically,'30 this proposal provides for home and community-based care to severely disabled persons of all ages under a federally financed social insurance (i.e., non-means tested) program
administered by the states according to federal eligibility, cost con122. Id. at 30-50, 251-69.
123. Id. at 237-47.
124. Congressional members of the Pepper Commission included Senators John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.) (Chairman), Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), Max Baucus (D-Mont.), Dave
Durenberger (R-Minn.), David Prior (D-Ark.), John Heinz (R-Pa.), and Representatives Fortney
H. Stark (D-Cal.), Henry A. Waxman (D-Ca.), Mary Rose Oakar (D-Ohio), Bill Gradison
(R-Ohio), Tom Tauke (R-Iowa), and Louis Stokes (D-Ohio). Public members were James
Balog (Lambert-Brussels Capital), Dr. James Davis (AMA), and Dr. John Cogan (Hoover
Institute).
125. See generally C. PEPPER wr H. GoREY, PEPPER: EYnwrrNss TO A CENTURY (1987).
126. UNITED STATES BPARaisAN COMM'N ON ComlREHaaNsIv HEALrm CARE, ACCESS TO
HEALTH CARE AND LoNo-TERM CARE FOR AnL AmERIcANs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 2,
1990) [hereinafter BiPARTisAN CoMm'N REPORT]; PEPPER REPORT, supra note 7.
127. Voting in the affirmative were Pepper Commission members Senators Rockefeller,
Kennedy, Baucus, Durenberger, Pryor, and Heinz, Representatives Waxman, Oakar, and
Stokes, Mr. Baog, and Dr. Davis. Voting in opposition were Representatives Stark, Tauke,
and Gradison, and Dr. Cogan.
128. Compare the "front end" coverage suggested by the Pepper Commission with the
"back end" coverage (public financing of nursing home care exceeding two years) recommended
by the Brookings Institute report, see A. RIViN & J. WENER, supra note 13, at 30-50, 25169.
129. PEPPER REPORT, supra note 7, at 119-29.
130. See BiPARTisAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 126, at 3 (Summary: Recommendations
on Long-Term Care), 13-17.
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tainment, quality assurance, and consumer protection guidelines.' 3' All
nursing home users would be entitled to social insurance for the first
three months of nursing home care under a new Nursing Home Program (NHP) jointly financed by the federal and state governments and
administered by individual states under federal guidelines. 13 2 Private
insurers, encouraged through enactment of federal tax incentives, would
fill in the gaps left by the public program, subject to government standards and oversight. 133 While the Commission estimated a need for
new annual federal expenditures of $66.2 billion to implement its longterm care proposals, 13 4 it failed (to the consternation of the Report's
dissenters) 135 to indicate the sources of revenue for meeting these expenditures.
Two other federal government reports should be extremely influential in shaping future discussions of long-term care financing reform. The quadrennially mandated Social Security Advisory Council
is scheduled to deliver to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
its recommendations on, among other things, long-term care financing
by the spring of 1991. This report, as well as one being simultaneously
prepared by a Department of Health and Human Services Task Force
are scheduled to be reviewed by the DHHS Domestic Policy Council
before the Council makes recommendations to the President.
Almost immediately upon release of the Pepper Commission Report, Commission member Mary Rose Oakar (D-Ohio) introduced a
bill in Congress, the "Comprehensive Health Care for All Americans
Act/Claude Pepper Comprehensive Health Care Act,113 6 which would
implement the Commission's recommendations. This bill is the latest
attempt over the past few years to address the long-term care financing
problem.
There are also other notable Congressional entries. In 1987, amidst
debate over the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, 137 legislation was
introduced to provide public financing for home care to the elderly
and to those under age sixty-five with chronic illnesses. 13 8 The bill was
131. Not surprisingly, this portion of the Report has received an especially warm reception
from the National Association for Home Care. See Staff of the Nat'l Ass'n for Home Care,
The Pepper Commission Report: A New Age for Long-Term Home Care, CARINo, April 1990,
at 26, 30 ("The Pepper Commission has squarely faced the problem of long-term care and
found that the answer is home care. We should revel in the endorsement . .
132. BIPARTISAN CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 126, at 124-25.
133. Id. at 129.
134. Id. at 21.
135. Id. at 193, 210, 235.
136. H.R. 4253, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNo. REc. H755 (1990).
137. Medicare Catastrophic Act, supra note 34, repealed by Medicare Catastrophic Act
Repealed, supra note 34.
138. H.R. 2762, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONo. Rc. H5520 (1987).
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designed to pay for medical and other care delivered to elderly individuals afflicted with conditions such as Alzheimer's disease or cancer, younger adults disabled by accident or disease, and children with
chronic illness who depend on medical technology for survival. 13 9 Offered as a substitute to the catastrophic legislation in the House of
Representatives, it soundly was defeated. 40
Also in 1987, Representatives Pepper and Edward R. Roybal (DCal.), Pepper's successor as Chairman of the House Select Committee
on Aging, introduced a bill entitled the "Medicare Longterm Home
Care Catastrophic Protection Act of 1987," which would have established # much more expansive long term home health benefit under
the Medicare program.1 41 The bill was defeated on the House floor
in June 1988 by a 243 to 169 vote.
In 1988, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) sponsored the "Lifecare Long-Term Care Protection Act,"' 142 an $18 billion federally

financed nursing home and home care coverage plan. Under this proposal, eligible senior citizens would have received six months of nursing home care and unlimited home care for free. Medicare then would
have paid sixty-five percent of nursing home bills incurred beyond six
months. 43 Beneficiaries would have contributed a monthly premium
to help defray the program costs.' 44
At roughly the same time, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-Me.) introduced legislation to provide public coverage for nursing home stays exceeding an exclusionary period of up to two years. 45
During the exclusionary period, beneficiaries would have been responsible for paying the costs of care with private funds or private
long-term care insurance. Once Medicare payments began, beneficiaries would have incurred co-payments of thirty percent for nursing
home costs and twenty percent for home health care services.'" The
bill also provided an enhanced Medicare benefit for services provided
either in the home or in an adult day care setting. 47
Also in 1988, Representative Henry Waxman (D-Cal.), Chairman
of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health, introduced the "Elder-Care Long-Term Care Assistance Act of 1988."14
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
H.R. 3436, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H8237 (1987).
S. 2681, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. Rnc. S10762 (1988).
Id.
Id.
S. 2305, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. Rnc. S4505 (1988).
Id.
Id. The bill never reached the floor of either House.
H.R. 5320, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CoNG. REc. H7754 (1988).
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This legislation would have substantially revamped the Medicare and
Medicaid programs to, among other things, provide public financing
for long term community and nursing facility care for the elderly and
149
persons with low incomes.
On February 22, 1990, Representative Roybal introduced a House
counterpart'5 ° to Senator Kennedy's "Lifecare Long-Term Care Protection Act."' 5 ' Although those who would be immediately eligible for
home and community-based care and nursing home care would be
disabled children, impaired elderly, and Medicare-eligible adults over
age sixty-five, the sponsor envisions eventual coverage for persons of
all ages. 5 2 Congressional bills addressing paid care for disabled persons whose family caregivers need an occasional respite include bills
sponsored by Representatives Douglas Walgren (D-Pa.)'53 and Fortney
Stark (D-Cal.),' 5 4 and Senators Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) 515 and David Dur56
enberger (R-Minn.).'
Innovative approaches to long-term care financing also have been
proposed on the state level. For example, the Kansas House Appropriations Committee in 1990 recommended passage of H.B. 2890, which
would provide incentives for the purchase of private long-term care
insurance. Under a pilot program, people could purchase private insurance policies to protect their financial assets. People would pay for
nursing home care with the proceeds of the insurance policy and then
become eligible for Medicaid without spending down beyond those
assets equivalent to the private insurance contribution.
V.

Public Policy Themes

What lessons may be drawn from the various proposals sketched
above and will inform the continuing discussion and debate on longterm care financing? A number of common public policy themes run
throughout the proposals and ultimately will need to be resolved if
meaningful change is to be achieved. 5 7
149. Id. The bill never reached the floor of either House.
150. H.R. 4093, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. RaG. H592 (1990).
151. S. 2163, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S1497 (1990).
152. See Currents: Long-Term Care, supra note 24.
153. H.R. 4173, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. RaEc. H592 (1990) (Medicare In-Home
Care Benefit Act).
154. H.R. 3880, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. Rac. H85 (1990); H.R. 5300, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. Rc. H4989 (1990) (Mediplan Act of 1990).
155. S. 2246, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S2310 (1990).
156. S. 2686, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. Rac. S7001 (1990). This bill would allow
for Medicaid reimbursement for personal care attendant (PCA) services provided outside the
home (for instance, at school or shopping).
157. For a synopsis of policy variables, see generally Capitman, Managing Transitions:
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These policy questions revolve around how responsibility for longterm care financing should be allocated between the public and private
sectors of the American economy.' s The strong current consensus is
that any credible, effective solution to the financing conundrum must
necessarily involve both the public (on multiple governmental levels)
and private sectors as complementary, rather than competing, forces
meeting a multifaceted challenge.' 59 The key issue thus becomes not
one of which sector should bear the burden, but rather one of deciding
which sector should bear primary versus secondary or residual responsibility.' 60
A.

6
Public Sector Responsibility' '

A number of arguments have been advanced in support of pri-

mary reliance on the public sector for long-term care financing.

62 First,

government-sponsored programs, in which participation is mandatory,
essentially eliminate the problem of adverse selection, that is, the prob-

lem that persons most likely to utilize a benefit are also the most likely
to purchase insurance to obtain that benefit16 The possibility of adverse selection causes apprehension among private insurers and has
inhibited the development of private long-term care insurance.'

64

A

The Challenge in Postacute and Long-Term Care Financing and Delivery, in PEw HEALTH
POLICY PROGRAM, CHRONIC DISEASE AND DIsABILITY: BEYOND TE ACUTE MEDICAL MODEL
(1990) [hereinafter CHRONIC DISEASE AND DisAnrry]. For a discussion of barriers to moving
beyond the status quo, see Pawlson & Mourey, supra note 117, at 697-98.
158. See Pawlson, supra note 9, at 635 ("Private Enterprise and Voluntary, Individual
Responsibility vs. Public Financing: This is a basic and still unresolved issue in the financing
of health care in the United States and is the major reason for a lack of consensus regarding
the financing of long-term care.").
159. See, e.g., Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Hearing on Long-Term Needs of the
Elderly: A Federal-State-PrivatePartnership, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Hrg. 98-1087 (July 10,
1984); Meiners & McKay, Private vs. Social LTC Insurance: Beware the Comparison, GENERATIONS, Spring 1990, at 32-34; Somers, supra note 21.
160. See Pawlson & Mourey, supra note 117. These authors propose different answers to
this question depending on whether the patient's need for long-term care services is of limited
(expand Medicare as a first payer) or long duration (universal public financing, but only after
a substantial elimination period).
161. See generally A. RIVLN & J. WIENER, supra note 13, at 155-247 (public sector
strategies for reform).
162. See generally R. BALL, BECAUSE WE'RE ALL IN Tins TOGETHER: THE CASE FOR A
NATIONAL LONG-TERm CARE INSURANCE POLICY (1989); Spence & Hanley, Public Insurance
Options for Financing Long-Term Care, GENERATIONS, Spring 1990, at 28.
163. The health insurance industry defines adverse selection as the "tendency of persons
with poorer than average health expectations to apply for, or continue, insurance to a greater
extent than do persons with average or better health expectations." HEALTH INSURANCE Ass'N
OF AMERICA, 1986-1987 SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 83 (1987).
164. BIPARTISAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 126, at 104.
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mandatory government program could spread the economic risk very
broadly across a population in which most of the insureds would be
young, healthy, and unlikely to claim long-term care benefits. This
risk-spreading capacity makes insuring against the expensive but rel165
atively rare occurrence of long-term care need actuarially feasible.
The Long-Term Care Campaign, mentioned above,' 66 has adopted as
a legislative principle: "The financial risk of long-term care should
be spread as broadly as possible, through a social insurance program
similar to Social Security or Medicare."
Further, government insurance programs may be financed more
equitably than by the extremely high premiums now charged against
at-risk older individuals who purchase private long-term care insurance
from conservative insurers seeking to protect themselves financially
against the effects of adverse selection. 167 A myriad of different revenue options exist. 16 Public programs may be financed by a progressive income tax by which the required contribution imposed is
related directly to one's ability to pay. 16 9 Financing also may be accomplished through a payroll tax, like those presently funding the Social Security Retirement, Social Security Disability Insurance, and
Medicare Part A trust funds. 170 "Sin" sales or excise taxes on consumer items like cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and gasoline are another frequently mentioned potential source of revenue. These taxes
may be politically palatable because costs are incurred by those engaging in voluntary conduct that is arguably injurious to the public
and thus contributes directly to skyrocketing health expenditures. Such
taxes levied disproportionately on those persons most likely to benefit
from the funded programs amount to an indirect user or consumption
fee.
Increases in estate taxes constitute another politically tolerable
funding opportunity.' 7' Since public financing programs would protect
165. "The fundamental principle of insurance is, in fact, to minimize the losses of one or
a few individuals by spreading the risks (of their medical expenses) among many. In its ideal
form, insurance provides a mechanism by which losses can be spread on an equitable basis to
all members of the group." CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, INSURING THE UNINSURED: OPTIONS
AND ANALYSIS, 100th. Cong., 2nd Sess. 12 (Comm. Print Oct. 1988).
166. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
167. See Long-Term Care Campaign Legislative Principle No. 5, which states: "The new
public program should be supported through sources of financing that are as progressive as
possible."
168. For a good overview, see J. GIST, OPTIONS FOR THE PUBLIC FINANCING OF LONG-TERM
CARE, (AARP Pub. Pol'y Inst., Dec. 1989).

169.
170.
171.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 4.
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private assets of long-term care recipients and would thereby leave the
funds available for inheritance, the heirs arguably should
pay their fair
1 72
program.
asset-protection
that
of
costs
the
of
share
Another argument in favor of government involvement in longterm care financing is the philosophical position that requiring individuals to spend down their private assets to qualify for Medicaid coverage fundamentally demeans the elderly. Forcing older persons to
achieve wealth and then prove poverty deprives them of a measure of
basic human dignity, 1and
society should not condone such a mean73
spirited public policy.
Public sector long-term care financing also promises relatively low
administrative costs, with the bulk of revenues collected actually being
used to pay for services received by program beneficiaries. 174 Government programs generally entail a certain amount of bureaucracy
and inefficiency that (at least in theory) is reduced in a private market
driven by the profit motive and unencumbered by a civil service workforce. 175 Nonetheless, the absence of a profit margin and the elimination of marketing expenses (since participation would be mandatory)
arguably makes the public sector more competitive than private in176
surers in terms of the income to benefits payout ratio.
A public program also attracts potential beneficiaries because it
would be subject to the pressures brought to bear through the political
process. Thus, politically powerful senior citizen interest groups' 77 most
likely could prevent the erosion of benefits over time, and probably
even could influence policymakers to adjust benefits upward on a regular basis to account for inflation.
Assuming a substantial role for the public sector in the financing
of long-term care, a number of policy questions remain regarding the
design and implementation of specific financing mechanisms. These
details raise a combination of pragmatic and philosophical concerns.
First, how open-ended should a public long-term care financing
program be in terms of the consumer's ability to choose among particular services and providers? 78 For example, should families and
friends of the service beneficiary be eligible to receive government pay172. Id.
173. Cf. Cole, Thoughts on Old Age and the Welfare State: PoliticalEconomy, History,
and Health Policy, 33 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 869 (1985).
174. J. GisT, supra note 168.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Cf. Torres-Gil & Pynoos, Long-Term Care Policy and Interest Group Struggles, 26
GERONTOLOGIST 488 (1986).
178. See C. SxBAiiNo, supra note 82; Kapp, supra note 82.
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ments? 179 What limits should be placed on the amount, scope, and
duration of service coverage under a government program? Legislative
Principle No. 2 of the Long-Term Care Campaign implores: "A national long-term care program should provide a comprehensive range
of facility-based and community-based health, social and support services."' 810 This approach would allow consumers a complete selection
of services and providers, as opposed to a relatively narrow range of
choices available under present financing mechanisms.
Second, should public coverage of long-term care services be
structured on a first-dollar (front end) or catastrophic (back end) basis? Put differently, should public funds be relied upon only as a last
resort, after a specified amount of private funds have been exhausted
(or the individual lacks personal funds in the first instance), or should
public funding act as the initial payer with private financing mechanisms acting as a safety net? The respective proposals of the Brookings Institution 8 1 and the Pepper Commission 82 represent different
approaches to this issue. Former Social Security Commissioner Robert
M. Ball recently has entered this fray on the side of federal financing
as the primary mechanism, with private responsibility supplementing
needs unmet by public insurance. 183
Third, who will pay the public dollars devoted to long-term care
financing, and who will benefit from those dollars? What is the most
advantageous combination of federal versus state responsibility, both
fiscal and administrative? 8 4 What kinds of taxes should be levied to
sustain the program? Should financing emanate from general revenues
or from taxes that explicitly have been designated for long-term care
purposes? A public that wants long-term care financing seriously
enough might support a dedicated tax even while opposing general tax
increases. 85 Dedicated taxes appeal to fiscal conservatives because such
179. See Linsk, Keigher & Osterbusch, States' Policies Regarding Paid Family Caregiving,
28 GERONTOLOGIST 204 (1988); see also H.R. 5189, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC.
H4403 (1990) (Elderly Americans' Economic Security Act of 1990) (allowing individuals a tax
deduction for expenses exceeding five percent of adjusted gross income incurred in care of
certain elderly individuals).
180. See also Moon, Taking the Plunge: The Arguments for a Comprehensive Long-Term
Care System, 37 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1165 (1989).
181. See A. RrviIN & J. WIENER, supra note 13.
182.

PEPPER REPORT, supra note 7.

183. Ball, supra note 117.
184. See Somers, Long-Term Care: The Need for, and the Limits of, an Effective Federal
Role, 110 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 3-4 (1989) (former strong proponent of a universal federal
long-term care financing program now calls for "a creative combination of federal, state, and
private sector responsibility and leadership").
185. A study conducted for the American Association of Retired Persons by the Daniel
Yankelovich polling group found that a majority of Americans would be willing to pay up to
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taxes help control spending increases by linking expanded benefits directly with increased costs for the taxpayers. 8 6 Redirecting existing

in
revenues, on the other hand, would require a substantial reduction
7
other public spending or a major increase in general taxes.'1
Should participation in both revenue-collection and coverage aspects of a long-term care financing scheme be conducted on an in-

tergenerational basis or limited to persons over a certain age? Should
people qualify for program benefits on a universal, social insurance
basis (perhaps a Medicare Part C),'18 or should we target-and thus
stretch-benefits by conditioning qualification on a financial means
test? Would means testing categorize the program as a form of welfare, with the attendant disadvantages in terms of status, dignity, and

political precariousness that label carries? Moreover, would an expanded means tested program create incentives that exacerbate the
problem presently inspired by Medicaid eligibility rules of individuals
who, aided by a growing phalanx of professionals,' 9 arguably "game"
the system by engaging in creative financial planning strategies to ar-

tificially impoverish themselves for bookkeeping purposes?' 9°
Financial status aside, should individuals qualify for public program eligibility on the grounds of medical diagnosis or functional criteria (such as limitations in conducting a specified number of activities
of daily living), as many professionals in the field are urging?' 9' The
$50 per month for long-term care protection. Long-Term Care in America: Public Attitudes
and Possible Solutions, Omo HEALTH CARE Ass'N INFo. ExcHANGE, April 30, 1989, at 2; cf.
Stone & Kemper, Spouses and Children of Disabled Elders: How Large a Constituency for
Long-Term Care Reform?, 67 MILBANK Q. 485 (1989) (according to the federal Agency for
Health Care Policy and Research, 13.3 million Americans, including one of every six persons
45 to 64 years of age, have a disabled elderly parent or spouse and therefore are potential
caregivers). See generally McConnell, supra note 6.
186. Atkins, supra note 114.
187. Id. at 21.
188. Id. at 20.
189. See, e.g., A. BUmDSH, Avoumnm TE MEDICAID TRAP: How TO BEAT THE CATASTROPHIC
COSTS OF NURSING HOME CARE (1989); I. SCHNEIDER & E. HUBER, supra note 42; P. STRAUSS,
R. WOLF & D. SrminNa, AGING AND THE LAW (1990); Pear, ProtectingFamily Assets: A New
Breed of Medicaid Counselors Steps In, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1987, at 12; Rowland, Avoiding
the Poverty of Elder Care, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1990, sec. 3, at 17, col. 1.
190. Compare Moses, supra note 47 (arguing that intentional asset divestiture through
shelters and transfers to qualify for Medicaid long-term care coverage is epidemic) and Quinn,
Do Only the Suckers Pay?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 18, 1989, at 52 and UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
HLTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, TRANSFER OF ASSETS IN THE
MEDICAID PROGRAM: A CASE STUDY IN WASHINGTON STATE, OAI-09-88-01340 (May 1989) with
Wiener, Hanley & Harris, supra note 47, at 417 (arguing that impoverishment of nursing
home residents usually is authentic); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (1988) (Medicaid transfer
of assets rules); UNTnD STATES DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., HALTH CARE FINANCING
ADMINISTRATION, STATE MEDICAID MANUAL, Transmittal No. 46 (July 1990).
191. See Rowland, Measuring the Elderly's Need for Home Care, HEALTH A.s., Winter
1989, at 39; Stone & Murtaugh, The Elderly Population with Chronic Functional Disability:
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Long-Term Care Campaign's Legislative Principle No. 1 states: "Longterm care services [supported with government financing] should be
available to all who need them, regardless of age or income. Eligibility
should be based on functional, cognitive or behavioral limitations, or
the need for supervision because of risk to safety or health, or the need
for support or training."
This approach to eligibility for publicly-financed services emphasizes clinical rather than financial criteria. Need would be defined
in this formulation in functional, not fiscal, terms. The pool of potential beneficiaries would thus include numerous members of the middle class.
B.

Private Responsibility

The rationale for treating long-term care financing as an essentially private matter is fairly straightforward: Why else do people save
money and other assets during their lives except to pay for the sat92
isfaction of their and their loved ones' needs when they grow old?
If public policy permits older persons to maintain their accumulated
assets while still receiving good quality long-term care services at public expense, it is not, so the argument runs, the patient who benefits
directly but the middle-aged, middle class heirs of that patient? Thus,
for instance, many children and grandchildren inherit houses from
parents or grandparents whose nursing home care or home care has
been financed through Medicare or Medicaid. Is this result a legitimate
objective of long-term care public policy that should be funded by
taxpayers regardless of the actual financial capacity of the long-term
care patient? Although consensus on these questions is lacking, most
people today would probably agree that patients and their families
have at least some personal responsibility to help provide for their own
and their elderly relatives' long-term care. 93
There are basically three ways in which public policy might be
molded to encourage or enforce such an obligation: facilitate the sale
Implications for Home Care Eligibility, 30 GERONTOLOosr 491 (1990); Wiener, supra note 15,
at 8.
192. See A. RivLiN & J. WINNER, supra note 13, at 53-56.
193. See A.M.A., HEALTH AcCEss AmERICA (1990) (AMA's comprehensive proposal to
expand Medicaid and revamp Medicare, in which government would help individuals to pay
the premiums to purchase private long-term care insurance); E. HAIsLMAIER, MAKmnG LONGTEsu CARE MoPE AFFORDABLE (1990); Balfe, Boyle, Brocki & Lane, A Health Policy Agenda
for the American People, Phase I: The Principles, 254 J. A.M.A. 2440, 2446 (1985) (Principle
4-22).
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and purchase of private long-term care insurance policies; facilitate
other financial planning devices; and compel family out-of-pocket

monetary responsibilities through command and control regulation.
These alternative, although not mutually exclusive and perhaps even

complementary, approaches are discussed below.
(1) Private Long-Term Care Insurance"4
Since the inception of the idea less than a decade ago,

95

private

long-term care insurance has developed at a snail-like pace.'9 The marketplace, however, is getting busier.' 97 While only sixteen companies
offered long-term care insurance policies in 1984,198 by 1988 the number was 105 and in 1989 had grown to 118.' 99 Similarly, the number
of long-term care policies in effect increased thirty-six percent from
December 1988 to December 1989. 2m
To date, there have been several major barriers to the development of a private long-term care insurance market robust enough to
relieve public pressure for a governmental solution to the financing
problem. 20' These impediments revolve around price and quality.
First and foremost, very high premium costs have put the purchase of private long-term care insurance policies beyond the financial
grasp of the majority of older Americans. 2 2 Many people mistakenly
194. See generally A. Raw & J. WIENER, supra note 13, at 39-82.
195. Meiners, The Case for Long-Term Care Insurance, HE.ALT AFF., Summer 1983, at
55; see also The Cost of Caring for the Chronically Ill. The Case for Insurance: Hearing
Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); M. MEINERS, THE
STATE OF THE ART IN LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH SERV.
RESEARCH (1984); Meiners & Trapnell, Long-Term Care Insurance: Premium Estimates for

Prototype Policies, 22 MED. CARE 901 (1984) (all seminal expositions of the private long-term
care insurance concept).
196. See S. EASTAUGH, supra note 50, at 198-99.
197. See Boyd, LTC Insurance: It's Your Choice, GENERATIONS, Spring 1990, at 23-27
(insurance industry executive singing the praises of private long-term care insurance).
198. Long-Term Care Becomes a Hot Product in the Insurance Market, Wall St. J., Dec.
15, 1988, at Al, col. 5; see also A Guide to Purchasing Medigap and Long-Term Care
Insurance: An Information Paper to the Special Senate Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., S. Prt. 101-94, Serial No. 101-L, at 14-19 (Apr. 1990).
199. Survey Shows Increase in Long-Term Care Insurance Policies, NAT'L HEALTH LAW.
Ass'N NEWs REP., May 1990, at 5 (reporting on a survey conducted by the Health Insurance
Association of America (HIAA), Washington, D.C.).
200. Id.; see also HEALTH INS. Ass'N OF AM., THE CONStMR'S GurDE TO LONG-TERM CARE
INSURANCE (1988).
201. See T. RICE, K. THomAs &"W. WEISSERT, THE IMPACT OF OwING PRrVATE LONOTERm CARE INSURANCE POLCmS ON OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS (AARP Pub. Pol'y Inst. Aug.
1989), at 71-75; Wiener, supra note 15, at 7-8.
202. See, e.g., FA mmlus USA FOUNDATION, THE UNAFFoRDABLrTY OF NtRSINo HomE
INSURANCE (1990); Wiener, Hanley & Harris, supra note 47, at 417; Who Can Afford a
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believe that Medicare provides full protection against the costs of longterm care. 20 3 Since few people consider buying long-term care insurance until they are old and frail (that is, until they are at high risk
of claiming the covered benefit), private insurers cannot spread their
risk over a sufficiently sizable pool to avoid adverse selection. High
private premium prices have resulted given the pool of insureds currently available. The insurance industry's additional concern about
moral hazard, or excessive benefit utilization, particularly regarding
home care, heightens this problem.
How can government help individuals overcome the affordability
hurdle to purchasing private long-term care insurance? Should tax dollars be used to subsidize or leverage the purchase of private insurance
contracts? If so, how?
Government financed need-related subsidies of premiums is one
possibility. Another policy strategy to enhance the role of private longterm care insurance would involve the manipulation of federal and
4
state tax treatment of premiums, reserves, and benefit payments.20
Tax incentives also could be employed to bolster the role of employers
as purchasers of private long-term care insurance on behalf of their
employees and retirees, a role that largely has been dormant thus far. 2°
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation currently is funding demonstration projects in eight states that would use public money to leverage the purchase of private long-term care insurance through those
states' respective Medicaid programs. 206 In these pilot projects, individuals purchasing private long-term care insurance for a specific
amount of coverage could, upon exhaustion of that coverage, shelter
personal assets up to the dollar amount of the coverage they had purchased while still qualifying for Medicaid eligibility. Early reports from
the planning phase appear favorable. 20 7
Nursing Home?, CONSUMER REPORTS, May 1988, at 300 [hereinafter CONSUMER REPORTS];
Mangan, Cost of Providing Long-Term Health Care for Retirees Too Expensive, Harvard
Finds, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 25, 1987, at 14.
203. Brickfield, Long-Term CareFinancing Solutions Are Needed Now, Am. HEALTH CARE
ASS'N J., Oct. 1985, at 11 (reporting on a Gallop Poll taken for the AARP).
204. H.R. 5189, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. Rc. H4403 (1990) (Elderly Americans'
Economic Security Act of 1990); Pawlson, supra note 9, at 635.
205. See H.R. 5090, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H3892 (1990) (a bill to amend
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the Social Security Act to provide comprehensive
incentives for the provision of long-term care); S. 2199, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG.
REc. S1833 (Health and Long-Term Care Security Act of 1990, introduced by Senator Robert
Packwood (R-Or.)); R. LEvrN & R. FROBOM, THE CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE ON LONG-TERM
CARE: SURvEY REPORT (1987); Chinsky, Employer Initiatives in Long-Term Care: Meeting the
Challenge, in CHRONIC DISEASE AND DISABILITY, supra note 157.
206. Harnett, Eight States Will Test Long-Term Care Programs, HEALTHWEEK NEWS, Mar.
26, 1990, at 36-37.
207. Mahoney, The Connecticut Partnershipfor LTC, GENERATIONS, Spring 1990, at 71-
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Besides pricing barriers, quality deficiencies exist in private longterm care insurance policies marketed in the past. Private consumer
groups 2° and government watchdogs 2°9 have criticized the coverage
provisions of extant private insurance policies as representing poor
value for premium money paid.
Prevalent contract provisions that reduce the worth of private
insurance policies for consumers include requirements that long-term
care follow a period of prior hospitalization, restrictive level-of-care
definitions, unrealistically low coverage maximums, lack of an inflation adjustment, and failure adequately to include non-institutional
forms of care. 210 In December 1988, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) adopted revised model standards for
the sale of long-term care insurance policies recommending that states
prohibit such policies from containing prior hospitalization or level-ofcare requirements. 21 Many new policies entering the market already
2 12
omit such provisions.
State regulators are faced with the challenge of policing private
insurance policies to protect potential consumers against fraud and
abuse. At the same time, regulation must not become so oppressive
that it stifles rather than stimulates innovative activity and risk-taking
213
in this field.
(2) Other FinancialPlanning Devices
Insurance is the most obvious, but by no means the sole, private
financial planning strategy available to individuals who anticipate longterm care expenses. 21 4 As an alternative, individuals could accumulate
72. But see UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFcE, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: PROPOSALS
TO LINK PRIVATE INSURANCE AND MEDICAID NEED CLOSE SCRUTINY, GAO/HRD-90-154 (Sept.
1990)
208. See, e.g., CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 202; T. RICE, K. THOMAS & W. WSSERT,
supra note 201; FAMILIES USA FoUND., FAMILIEs USA FOUINDATION CALLS FOR A FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION INVESTIGATION OF INSURANCE INDUSTRY ABUSE OF FRAI ELDERLY NURSING
HoME INSURANCE BUYrnts (1990); Steptoe & Slater, Insurers Improve Nursing-Home Policies,

But Critics Say More Changes Are Needed, Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1988, at B1, cols. 3-5.
209. See, e.g., UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, LoNG-T)EM CAR INSURANCE:
STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS PROVIDE INCONSISTENT CONSUMER PROTECTION, GAO/HRD89-67 (Apr. 24, 1989); UNITED STATES GEN. AccoUNTING OFnCE, LONG-TEIM CARE INSURANCE:
COVERAGE VARIES WIDELY IN A DEVELOPING MARKET, GAO/HRD-87-80 (May 29, 1987).
210. See UNITED SENIORS HEA
COOPERATVE, WILL YOUR INSURANCE PAY IF You NEED

HOME CARE? (1990).
211. T. RICE, K. THOMAS & W. WEISSERT, supra note 201, at 72.
212. Id.
213. See Larkin, Will Regulation Stifle Long-Term Care Insurance?, HOSPITALs, Feb. 5,
1988, at 76.
214. See, e.g., Mechanic, supra note 5, at 30-31.
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tax-free reserves, or Individual Medical Accounts215 similar to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) that would be used to pay for longterm care expenses later in life. 216 Another approach has focused on
the development of methods like "reverse annuity mortgages" to convert home equity accumulated by the elderly to cash to pay for longterm care expenses, without forcing the older person to sell the house
outright.

21 7

Other alternatives include further development of comprehensive,
capitated (i.e., financed on a per person basis) long-term care delivery
models such as social health maintenance organizations (SHMOs) 218
and continuing care retirement communities (CCRCs) 2 9 or life care
communities.220 A small number of insurance corporations, led by Prudential Insurance Company of America's "Living Needs Benefit,"
have started to experiment with permitting owners of life insurance
policies to liquidate their policy death benefits while still alive in order
to allow them to pay for long-term care expenses. 22' While this approach has generated substantial public interest, its long range impact
on issues such as the financial solvency of remaining elderly spouses
is unknown. As of 1990, the payment of accelerated death benefits
222
is allowed in only ten states.
(3) Relative Responsibility Laws
Federal Medicaid law permits the individual states to enact legislation compelling specified relatives to contribute financially to the
215.

See A. RMIN & J. WIENER, supra note 13, at 109-22.
Id. at 291 n.1.
Id. at 123-144; Jacobs, The National Potential of Home Equity Conversion, 26
GERONTOLOGIST 496 (1986); Jasen, The Elderly Discover Reverse Mortgages, Wall St. J., Sept.
19, 1990, at Cl, col. 3.
218. A. RivN & J. WIENER, supra note 13, at 96-108; Greenberg & Leutz, The Sociall
216.
217.

Health Maintenance Organizationand It's [sic] Role in Reforming the Long-Term Care System,
in LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING AND DELrVERY SYsTEMs: EXPLORING SOME ALTERNATVEs 5765, HCFA Pub. No. 03174 (1984) [hereinafter LONG TERM FINANCING ALTERNATIVES]; see also
Newcomer, Harrington & Friedlob, Awareness and Enrollment in the Social/HMO, 30 GERONTOLOGIST 86 (1990).
219. See Stearns, Netting & Wilson, supra note 66; Stearns, Netting, Wilson & Branch,

supra note 66; Tell & Cohen, supra note 66; see also Ruchlin, Continuing Care Retirement
Communities: An Analysis of Financial Viability and Health Care Coverage, 28 GERONTOLOGIST
156 (1988).
220. See Pies, Life Care Communities for the Aged-An Overview, in LONG-TERM FiNANcING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 218.
221.

See Beck, Improving Quality of Life: Insurance Payment Used for Long-Term Care,

Dayton Daily News, June 25, 1990, at IlA, col. 1.
222. Insurers Begin Paying Death Benefits To Cover Health Care Costs,
HOME CARE, Rep. No. 349 (Feb. 9, 1990), at 8.
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costs of long-term care services provided to a family member who is
unable to pay for the care and who, therefore, may be eligible for
Medicaid. 3 Many states have passed various forms of "Relative Re-

sponsibility" statutes in response to that federal invitation.

4

The wisdom2 of this type of forced contribution is debatable
both philosophically and in terms of financial efficacy.2 Laws of this

nature may have an extremely disruptive effect on intra-family relationships and generate deep feelings of guilt and resentment that could

counterproductively inure to the older person's disadvantage by, for
example, fomenting abuse or neglect or causing families to sever active
contact or support. In practical terms, enforcement of Relative Responsibility laws is problematic, " 7 and related administrative costs may
be disproportionately high compared to new revenues generated.22
The constitutionality of Relative Responsibility laws also has been at-

tacked under due process, equal protection, and privacy theories. "29
A provision in the federal Medicaid statute that authorizes individual states to impose liens against the assets, including real property, of persons receiving Medicaid benefits more indirectly
accomplishes the same goal as do the Relative Responsibility laws.2 0
States may not impose such liens, however, as long as the patient is
expected to return home or a spouse or dependent child lawfully oc223.

Treatment of Contributionsfrom Relatives to Medicaid Applicants or Recipients, 2
HEALTH CAUE F NANCmO Arnmw., STATE MEDICAID
MANUAL, § 3812 (1983). This document reversed a previous longstanding HCFA interpretation
of the federal Medicaid statute. For a legal critique of HCFA's current interpretation, see
Patrick, Honor Thy Father and Mother: Paying the Medical Bills of Elderly Parents, 19 U.
Rrcu. L. Ray. 69, 71-75 (1984).
224. More general Relative Responsibility laws have been on the books in the United States
for many years. See DeJong, A Legal Perspective on Disability, Home Care, and Relative
Responsibility, in FAMILY HoME CRmm: CRncAL Issuns FOR SERvICEs AND PoLucms 176 (R.
Perlman ed. 1983). The concept of legally mandating the family's moral support responsibilities
dates to the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2, § 7; see also Patrick, supra
note 223, at 75-78.
225. For a listing of arguments in favor of Relative Responsibility Laws, see Byrd, Relative
Responsibility Extended: Requirement of Adult Children to Pay for Their Indigent Parent's
Medical Needs, 22 F my LAW Q. 87 (1988).
226. For criticisms of Relative Responsibility laws, see id. at 99-102; Durso & Marshall,
Family Responsibility Statutes Raise Legal, Social Concerns, HEALTr PROR.ESS, Mar. 1985,
at 10-16; Sommers & Shields, Making Changes: Reforms Needed Today, Longer-Term Solutions, and How to Get There, CAamio, March 1990, at 19, 23-24.
227. Kapp, Residents of State Mental Institutions and Their Money (Or, the State Giveth
and the State Taketh Away), 6 J. PsYCHiATRY & L. 287, 314-17 (1978).
228. Id. at 310 n.180.
229. See Byrd, supra note 225, at 90-92; Patrick, supra note 223, at 78-81; cf. Kapp, supra
note 227.
230. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) § 132, 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)(1) (1988).
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cupies the home. Despite the federal government's imprimatur, few
states aggressively have pursued this potential source of revenue en231
hancement, even against the patient's estate.
C. Cost Containment
A final public policy theme runs throughout all serious proposals
for reform. Whatever combination of public and private responsibility
for long-term care financing is ultimately selected, effective cost controls must be built directly into the design of any financing system to
prevent intolerable costs from quickly materializing due to increases
23 2
in service utilization and priciig.
The cost containment strategies most often mentioned include:
imposition of deductibles and co-payments on the patient, case management acting as gatekeeper, clearly defined and limited eligibility
criteria, and reimbursement systems that directly and explicitly reward
quality and efficiency and punish the opposite. 233 Also suggested is
increased reliance on forms of managed long-term care, such as social
health maintenance organizations 23 4 and continuing care retirement
communities, 235 which have an inherent self-interested incentive to contain costs.
VI.

Implications for Students and Practitioners of the Law

Public policy issues regarding the structure and operation of a
long-term care financing and delivery system in this nation have numerous implications for students and practitioners of the law. Attorneys counsel clients and their families regarding how to plan for
the satisfaction of future medical, maintenance, social, and housing
231.

For criticisms of state performance in this regard, see UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNT-

ING OFFICE, MEDICAID: RECOVERIES FROM NURSING HOME RESIDENTS' ESTATES COULD OFFSET

PROGRAM COSTS, GAO/HRD-89-56 (Mar. 7, 1989); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS.,

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,

MEDICAID ESTATE RECovERIEs:

NATIONAL

PROGRAM INSPECTION, OAI-09-86-00078 (June 1988); Escarce & Lavizzo-Mourey, Recipients'
Estates: A Source of Revenue for Medicaid?, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. (1990).
232. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 15, at 8-9; Weissert, supra note 74.
233. See A. RIVLIN & J. WIENER, supra note 13, at 240; Fama & Kennell, supra note 109,
at 40-41; Holahan & Cohen, supra note 50, at 59-60.
234. But see Harrington & Newcomer, supra note 69 (while SHMOs are an interesting
concept, early demonstration projects have an overall poor track record of controlling utilization
rates and costs of services).
235. See Cohen, Tell, Bishop, Wallack & Branch, Patterns of Nursing Home Use in a
Prepaid Managed Care System: The Continuing Care Retirement Community, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 74 (1989); Tell & Cohen, supra note 66; Woodrich, Life Care Plans: Keeping the Lid
on Cost, FOR TIE DEFENSE, Feb. 1990, at 15.
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needs in a manner that assures quality, accessibility, and affordability.
This endeavor necessarily requires familiarity with public benefits and
private insurance requirements, as well as contract law as it might pertain to relationships between the client and entities such as SHMOs
and CCRCs. Knowledge of the principles of federalism as they apply
to the parsing out of federal and state responsibility for long-term care
financing as well as the role of public policy as a mechanism for the
social financing of health and other programs, is important for attorneys in terms of their role as advocates for social change.
Any discussion of long-term care financing also implicates employment law. The labor shortage in this area is critical already;2 6 and
as more money eventually becomes available for long-term care, there
is a major question about whether the supply of qualified personnel
can expand and be maintained at a level sufficient to meet both an
economic supply (i.e., the number of dollars available to purchase
services if personnel can be found to provide them) and a human demand for services that has risen to an unprecedented level.3 7 This personnel crunch is international in scopeY.38 In this context, long-term
care may well be the scene of future difficult battles regarding improvements in staff pay and working conditions, 239 with attorneys called
in to act as allies on all sides of the fray. The imposition of new federal
standards for the training and competency requirements of home health
aidesm and those federal standards proposed for nursing home aides24'
also will exert a marked effect on the labor law situation by affecting
job qualifications, level of supervision and review, and criteria for
termination or discipline of employees.
Conclusion
Long-term care in the United States must be provided to an aging
population, and it must be financed. Joshua Wiener of the Brookings
236. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH Aim HUMAN SERV., NAT'L INST. ON AGING,
PERSONNEL FOR HEALTH NEEDS OF THE ELDERLY THROUGH THE YEAR 2020, NIH Pub. No. 872950 (1987); Brannon & Smyer, Who Will Provide Long-Term Care in the Future?, GENERSpring 1990, at 64-67; cf. Waxman, Carner & Berkenstock, Job Turnover and Job
Satisfaction Among Nursing Home Aides, 24 GERONTOLOGIST 503 (1984).
237. See Kane, The Home Care Crisis of the Nineties, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 24 (1989).
238. See Monk & Cox, An InternationalPerspective on Home Care: Trends and Highlights
in Six Countries, CARING, Jan. 1990, at 4, 6.
239. Regarding working conditions, see P. FELDMAN, A. SAPIENZA & N. KANE, WHO CARES
FOR THEM? WORKERS IN THE HoME CARE INDusTRY (1990); Kane, supra note 237.
240. 42 C.F.R. § 484.4 (1989).
241. 55 Fed. Reg. 10948 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 483, subpts. B & D) (proposed
Mar. 23, 1990).
ATIONS,
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Institution put it succinctly: "We are going to have these costs. It's
just a matter of how we spread them. ' ' 24 2 As the debate continues
during the next several years over how to spread those costs in an
equitable, efficient, and politically acceptable way, 43 the specific substantive proposals and the overarching policy issues outlined in this
Article are likely to define the discussion parameters. For attorneys
and the health care consumers, providers, and insurers that they rep-

resent, the stake in the final shape of our long-term care financing
system is enormous.
242.
243.

Beck, Be Nice to Your Kids, supra note 77, at 75.
See Rockefeller, The Pepper Commission Report on Comprehensive Health Care, 323
NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1005 (1990) (chairman of the Pepper Commission report claims a higher
degree of political consensus for dealing with the long-term care issue than with the problem
of uninsured Americans: "On long-term care, the political gains in taking a stand are substantial
and the costs are relatively small.... [B]road-based support and limited opposition will
promote consensus on action ....").But see COOPERS & LYBRAND, HEALTHCARE FINANctAL
MANAGEMENT Ass'N, LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY IN THE 1990s: STRUCTURE AND
FNANcING 18-19 (1990) (suggesting that the "muddle through," incremental tinkering model
will continue to dominate the national response-or lack of response-to the eldercare financing
challenge).

